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Unifying America:
The Use of American Propaganda During World War I

Introduction
Throughout the course of history evil dictators, prophets, messiahs, presidents,
kings, queens, and even you and me have attempted to manipulate or sway public opinion
to our benefit. Examples include gaining extra allowance from one’s parents, as might be
the case with a small child; gaining public support and votes, in the case of presidential
candidates; or molding the mindset of millions into fighting a common enemy. All of
these examples demonstrate the effectiveness of persuasion and how in the right or wrong
hands it can be a powerful tool used for shaping the ideas and beliefs of millions. One
commonly seen and used form of persuasion is propaganda. The definition of propaganda
is: “information or publicity put out by an organization or government to spread and
promote a policy, idea, doctrine, or cause.” The ideas being promoted could be anything,
they could attempt to raise country morale or support a good cause, like the mini-war
clips shown in American movie theaters during the early 1940’s. However, the general
public most often associates propaganda with its more negative definition, “deceptive or
distorted information that is systematically spread.” The negatively perceived
connotation of propaganda most likely stems from the ways Joseph Goebbels and Adolph
Hitler used it during World War II, but propaganda has been used for thousands of years
and for causes both good and bad. Although, with definitions like the latter and the
patterns that have been seen throughout history, it is no surprise that people hear the word
propaganda and think of its potentially negative consequences.
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While the word is often seen as negative, few people ever connect the term
propaganda with the United States when, in fact, the United States is one of the biggest
users of propaganda in the world. The U.S. government used it heavily during the
Spanish-American war to create feelings of disgust toward the Spanish (Wilkerson), and
again during the two World Wars to increase American unity by unifying ideals and
creating enemies. It is my goal to investigate and uncover the ways the United States
used propaganda during the First World War to shape and mold American ideals. I will
also discuss what post World War I critics thought of the U.S. government’s use of
propaganda and explain why I believe that some were too harsh in their criticisms of the
government’s actions. Shaping a country’s beliefs through propaganda is no small task; it
takes a superior knowledge of how public opinion operates and how those opinions can
be manipulated to coalesce beliefs.

Propaganda
Some basic definitions of propaganda were listed above, but the importance and
functions of propaganda need a bit more explanation. According to Leonard W. Doob in
his book Public Opinion and Propaganda, “Propaganda can be called the attempt to
affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered
unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time” (240). The first part,
“the attempt to affect personalities and to control the behavior of individuals,” is selfexplanatory. The goal of propaganda is to influence, which is achieved by shaping and
molding attitudes, public perceptions, and beliefs. If it were possible to get everyone
thinking along the same line, that is, sharing the same values and attitudes, then there
would be no need to persuade anyone because everyone would already be thinking alike;
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however, the world does not function this way. There are millions of contrasting
viewpoints and opinions; propaganda works by narrowing that number down. If the
propagandist can bring a majority of people within the same belief system then they have
done their job effectively, since a majority opinion is usually all that is necessary to
provoke change. Once the propagandist has control over a group of people’s beliefs they
can get the group to act towards whatever ends the propagandist deems fit.
The next line in Doob’s passage discusses the types of knowledge, or information,
that can be used to propagandize. He says propaganda should be used “…toward ends
considered unscientific or of doubtful value…” Doob talks a great deal about knowledge
that contains scientific value versus knowledge that has yet to reach such stages. The
former could be described in terms of simple arithmetic. Two plus two equals four is a
demonstrable equation. There is no debating that. The arithmetic is proven by empirical
observation and cannot be argued unless a person’s upbringing contained a different kind
of math, maybe one where 2 + 2 = 5. But if someone was taught that 2 + 2 = 5, Doob
argues that the arithmetic they learned is propaganda because there is no science, or
empirical observation, that can prove the argument that two plus two equals five.
According to Doob, knowledge that has yet to reach the scientific stage is information
that can be used by the propagandist to change beliefs. To give an example of this kind
of knowledge Doob uses the classroom setting. He asks readers to imagine potential
arithmetic questions a teacher might give. The teacher could just ask the students to
divide sixty-by-eighty if he or she wanted the answer, but teachers often pose the math
problem in the form of a short story. Doob gives four examples of possible questions, but
I am only going to cover two: the first is that the teacher simply asks what sixty divided
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by eighty is, to which the students calculate the answer, 0.75. However, for the second
example, the one expressing propaganda, Doob shares another potential question:
“Medical and health authorities agree that a family of four requires a minimum wage of
$80 per week. The John J. Jones company in our town pays most of its workers only $60
per week. What percentage of a decent minimum wage do these workers receive?” Here
the students are asked to do the same arithmetic problem, divide sixty-by-eighty, only
this time the teacher added her viewpoint to the question. Now, the question is not just
testing the students ability to do basic math, it is also instilling the idea that the John J.
Jones Company underpays its workers, and should therefore be scrutinized for it.
Dividing sixty-by-eighty is knowledge that contains scientific value, but assessing the
ethical practices of the John J. Jones Company is not. The teacher has become the
propagandist according to Doob, who argues that there can be no scientific test applied to
the “opinion” that the local company underpays its employees. Knowledge of this type,
the type that cannot be disproved by science, is the type of knowledge that can be used
effectively to manipulate opinions.
The last part of Doob’s definition of propaganda, “ . . . in a society at a particular
time,” merely states that the propagandist must be aiming to move people to act toward
ends that are current or within the foreseeable future. Changing people’s attitudes and
beliefs about what happened in the past is possible, but it is impossible to change the past.
Therefore, the propagandist must make sure that they are directing people to act toward
something that can be changed. The likelihood that one person could influence enough
people to believe that the holocaust did not exist, and that all history books should be
rewritten to exclude that event is unlikely. A few people may be persuaded, but enough
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people know, scientifically, that six million people lost their lives in concentration camps
during the Second World War, and would be hard-pressed to believe that it did not take
place. How could someone convince a survivor, or a person who had a relative die in one
of the camps that it never happened? The aims of the propagandist must be realistic.
Although Doob offers a good definition of propaganda, Terence H. Qualter gives
a slightly different interpretation of the concept. He says in his book, Propaganda and
Psychological Warfare, that propaganda is “defined as the deliberate attempt by some
individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of the
instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction
of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist” (27). There are two main
advancements in this definition that Doob did not mention in his. First of all, for Qualter,
something can only be called propaganda if the message being promoted is deliberate
and intended by the propagandist. If a group is persuaded, or motivated, accidentally,
then it is not considered propaganda. A propagandist must exist and his attempt to control
and manipulate attitudes must be systematically thought out and planned. The other new
element that this definition offers is that propaganda is achieved through the instruments
of communication. The instruments of communication can be thought of as all possible
means of communication that can occur between people. Included in this list of possible
instrument are the spoken and written word, graphic representations, music, exhibitions,
and anything else that can be sensed with the eyes or ears.
How Does Propaganda Work
Now that the basic concept of propaganda has been outlined, an insight into why
it is effective and how it works must be discussed. Qualter lists four basic criteria for
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effective propaganda: “it must be seen, understood, remembered and acted upon” (75).
The first thing he mentions is that the propaganda must be seen. This is an obvious, yet
essential statement. If people are unable to see or hear the propagandist’s message, then
it becomes impossible to influence them. Therefore, effective propaganda must be placed
within an easily viewable location, usually one where there is frequent human traffic.
Notice that in any city around the world, monuments, billboards, Public Service
Announcements (PSA), and all other forms of propaganda are prominently displayed in
easily viewable locations. Monuments are placed in the middle of large squares or plazas
for everyone to look at. Billboards are placed on the sides of freeways where thousands
of people view them daily. Also, the billboards themselves are massive pictorial and
textual messages that are impossible to ignore. Announcements of all kinds, not just
PSA’s, are delivered through media that reach vast amounts of people, like the television,
radio, or newspaper. All of this shows that in order for propaganda to be effective it must
reach the masses, and it must be easily viewed or heard.
The next important factor for effective propaganda is that it must be understood.
If a propagandist is trying to influence human thought and action they must present their
information in an easily understandable way. Information that is misunderstood, or not
understood entirely, fails to achieve the desired effects of the propagandist. If a group
does not understand the message being promoted to them, they will not be motivated to
act. A message that is too complicated fails to achieve the intended goals of the
propagandist, which negates the message as propaganda altogether according to Qualter.
It becomes imperative that the propagandist forms their message in a way that all humans
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can understand. By using a more simple method of conveying the propaganda, the
propagandist will reach more citizens, which will influence more people toward change.
The third important factor of effective propaganda is that it must be remembered.
People cannot be motivated to act, or persuaded to change their beliefs if they cannot
remember the key points of the propaganda. A persuasive speech is not persuasive if the
audience fails to remember what the key points of the speech were. Arguments in the
message must be created and placed in important locales so that the audience remembers
the main points. Often, catchy slogans are used, like Woodrow Wilson’s re-election
slogan, “He kept us out of war!” or, in a more recent election, Barrack Obama’s slogan,
“Change.” These slogans help the public identify with the cause and it makes it easy for
general audiences to become familiar with the messages of the campaign.
The last ingredient essential for effective propaganda is that it must be acted upon.
If the first three elements of effective propaganda are used correctly, but the fourth is
never achieved, then nothing was really accomplished. The underlying goal of
propaganda is to create action. Whether that action is a changing of beliefs, or a
motivation to join the army, action is the result of effective propaganda. Without action
the propaganda can be seen as ineffective, thus making this component the most
important for effective propaganda.
In another book by Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell the issue of why
propaganda is effective is brought up. In the book, Propaganda and Persuasion, the
authors say that the media does not directly influence everyone, but only a select group of
people. An experiment done in 1940 by Paul Lazarsfeld studied whether mass media
influenced political attitudes. What he found was that “people were receiving
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information and influence from other people” (Jowett and O’Donnell 106). They
determined that certain people were not influenced by the media, but rather by “opinion
leaders,” in their social group. These “opinion leaders,” who were influenced by media
propaganda, promoted their newfound beliefs to their friends and colleagues. In turn, the
“opinion leader’s” friends and colleagues became influenced and persuaded. This
“Multi-Step Flow” model “has people obtaining ideas and information from the media,
but seeking out opinion leaders for confirmation of their ideas and forming [of] their
attitudes” (Jowett and O’Donnell 106). Propaganda is effective because only one person
needs to be moved toward change for an entire group to be persuaded. After one person
is influenced, they will spread their beliefs to their friends and colleagues, who will then
spread those ideas to others. The “Multi-Step Flow” model does a good job of explaining
how ideas are circulated so quickly among different social groups. Also, the model helps
explain why propaganda can be so influential because it only requires the manipulation of
one person’s beliefs for those ideas and beliefs to spread to an entire community.

Propaganda During World War I
I have discussed what propaganda is, and how it works, but I have yet to talk
about how America used propaganda during the Great War. I am now going to look at
the people responsible for the massive propaganda campaigns created and how they
managed to manipulate the minds of millions.
The Rise of George Creel
On June 28, 1914, the Archduke of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, and his
wife were assassinated, beginning the primary stages of the First World War. While
country after country became entangled in the war due to different allegiances and
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agreements, President Woodrow Wilson fought for neutrality. Even with the constant
urging of his peers and the American people to go to war, Wilson insisted that the United
States stay neutral. In fact, he centered his re-election campaign on the ideal that
America would stay clear from the war, a point he emphasized via his campaign slogan,
“He kept us out of war!” Yet, with the bombing of the Lusitania in 1915 and the sending
of the Zimmerman telegram in January of 1917, President Wilson was forced to enter the
war. But with his entire presidential career having been based on avoiding war, Wilson
had to turn to someone who could change his campaign without losing the support of the
American voters.
The man he turned to was George Creel, an up-and-coming muckraker, who was
one of Wilson’s biggest fans and advocates. “As a reform minded journalist, George
Creel was all about leading change, shaping opinion, creating public sentiment,
mobilizing the collective will, and yet he repeatedly demonstrated a remarkable paucity
of self-direction” (Axelrod 21). He had brought down prostitution and political
corruption in Colorado, and had fought child labor in New York. Creel was an idealist,
just like his icon Woodrow, and so for Wilson, Creel was the perfect man to help change
his stance from pro-neutrality, to pro-war. He portrayed the United States’ entry to the
war “as an idealistic and ideological imperative, a fight to ‘make the world safe for
democracy,’ as the President most famously put it in his war message to Congress on
April 2” (Axelrod 47). It seems ironic that only twelve months earlier Creel was writing
how Wilson’s belief in neutrality was the best course of action for the country.
George Creel had a knack for selecting key points that strengthened his
arguments, regardless of the cause. This made him the perfect journalist, muckraker, and
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conveniently, a great campaign strategist, which the president quickly recognized.
Shortly after President Wilson changed his stance on war, he decided to utilize
propaganda to increase support for his new policies, which were vital to the war effort at
home and abroad. Having been impressed by the work George Creel had done on
changing his public stance from neutrality to pro-war, Wilson charged Creel with the task
of discovering a way to propagandize the American people.
For Creel, propaganda was not necessarily a bad thing. He believed “that
propaganda could be factually based and that, as such, it could be presented to people as
evidence, which, after weighing, would inevitable [sic] persuade them to decide
correctly—that is, to make the decisions the state wanted them to make” (Axelrod 49).
This concept of propaganda contrasts with the negative definition the public was, and still
is familiar with. Creel believed that if the people thought he was just laying out the facts,
and the facts pointed to his cause, which happened to be beneficial to America, then they,
the public, would inevitably conclude that Creel was right. With this method, Creel
could get people to believe and act how he wanted them to without them being aware of
it. Society just thought they were deciding to do what was best for their country. In a
sense, they felt they were being patriotic by following Creel, and since Creel had this
technique mastered from his early days as a muckrake journalist, he had no problem
changing the beliefs of millions. The belief he wanted to spread was that war was the
best course of action; and certain freedoms should be limited in order to protect the
troops abroad and the civilians at home.
Creel decided that the name of the government’s propaganda machine should not
be associated with any terms that leave people feeling like they were being controlled.
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Terms like bureau, agency, department, and ministry would just not suffice, but a term
like committee that “seemed to resonate from the epoch of the American Revolution”
(Axelrod 63) was perfect, and so the Committee on Public Information was born.
The Committee of Public Information
Also known as the Creel Committee, the Committee on Public Information (CPI)
was established to “oversee a program of voluntary censorship and to flood the media
with news from essentially official sources in a comprehensive effort to manage the war
information that reached the public” (Axelrod 74). Censorship was accomplished by first
convincing the media that they were releasing stories that were informative to the enemy,
which led to the deaths of U.S. troops. One example in particular came when a gun
exploded aboard the USS Mongolia, causing a blast that killed two nurses on board. One
paper, the Herald, heard about this and reported the incident and location of the vessel.
Shortly after, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, issued a statement that the
article the Herald printed gave Germany a four-day advance notice of where the United
States’ fleet of destroyers was headed. The statement allowed the Germans to prepare for
the fleets arrival, thus increasing the level of danger to American troops. Creel saw this
and realized that “voluntary censorship” was only so effective, because some papers
might print a story that seems irrelevant, but is actually damaging to the war strategy.
Based on this realization, Creel issued the “Preliminary Statement,” which listed a
number of regulations to be placed on the media preventing them from printing whatever
they wanted. The statement was said to prevent the enemy from gaining any sort of
advantage due to leaks from the press, but the list was essentially an extension of
government censorship. The list was extensive and included three categories of

13
information, “Dangerous, Questionable, and Routine,” with each category having
separate guidelines. The first category, Dangerous, had three subcategories, General,
Naval, and Military, and included all stories pertaining to Naval and Military operations
that were in progress. Stories that fell under this category included those that gave away
the position and number of ships or troops, any threats to the President, advancements in
experimental weaponry, and the location of foreign born U.S. workers to name a few.
The Questionable category was all material that “might” be acceptable for publication.
However, the CPI strongly advised that the newspaper use caution when printing these
stories, and only with the Committee’s permission. Stories within this category were
military training camp routines, general advancements in technology, and any sensational
rumors such as an outbreak of disease among Military divisions. All material not in these
two categories was placed in the Routine category and was deemed harmless to America
by the CPI; nonetheless, Creel urged all newspaper to submit an article to the CPI for
approval if there was even the slightest bit of doubt about the story. When the
Preliminary Statement was released on May 28, 1917, violating these regulations was not
against the law, so the press was still free to print what they pleased until the Espionage
Act was passed on June 15, which made all regulations issued by the Preliminary
Statement official laws.
Creel knew that these regulations would not sit pretty with the press because the
rules limited the newspapers freedom of speech as well as the number of available stories
to report on. His plan to eliminate such frustrations was to send out a bulletin to all the
newspapers. In this bulletin was an extensive list of stories that the government had come
across and deemed printable by the papers. The bulletin made it easy for newspapers to
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fill their pages without any scrutiny or negative attention from the government. “Under
the CPI war regime, news was not to be the result of investigation […] of private
enterprise, but public property to be apportioned equally to all. The Creel Committee
effectively nationalized the news. Not only did it come from a government source, it was
treated as government property” (Axelrod 105). All the big newspapers were sent story
updates via the ticker, and for smaller newspapers that could not afford a ticker, the CPI
issued a newsletter that any town could subscribe to. In that newsletter were a number of
current stories that the papers could print without scrutiny from the government. Semithrilled with the prospect of not having to work as hard for stories, many small towns
subscribed to the newsletter, and almost all major cities received ticker updates from the
CPI. The newsletter allowed the CPI to monopolize the news and control the stories
Americans were reading. But Creel realized that the newspapers were only one source of
information for Americans, and that there were other ways to spread American
propaganda. Creel devised a plan to create numerous propaganda agencies so that
propaganda could be manipulated to address specific audiences. “A Division of
Industrial Labor spoke to workers. A Division of Women's War Work mobilized women.
To reach schoolchildren, the committee published a weekly bulletin, the National School
Service [. . .] The Bureau of Cartoons offered commentaries on events. The Division of
Film, with its subsidiary departments, captured the war with photography and moving
pictures and produced newsreels. The Bureau of War Expositions and the Bureau of State
Fair Exhibits created numerous displays seen by an estimated 7 million people at 60 sixty
state fairs” (Vaughn 156). But none of the agencies created proved to be more successful
than The Division of Pictorial Publicity and the Four-Minute Men.
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The Division of Pictorial Publicity and the Four-Minute Men
When Creel was first pondering how he was going to propagandize America, he
realized the need for controlling the newspapers, which, at the time, were the largest and
most followed of all forms of media, but he also wanted to tap into other styles of
propaganda to increase support for the government and America in general. Those other
forms of propaganda included pictures and public speaking. In April 1917, Creel sent a
telegram to Charles Dana Gibson, the most popular name in American illustration at the
time, and asked him to gather a group of artists together to aid the government in war
related “pictorial publicity.” A few days later, and only nine days after the Committee on
Public Information was created, Creel and Gibson met. Shortly after this meeting the
Division of Pictorial Publicity was formed.
The mission of the Division of Pictorial Publicity was to create images that
conveyed a message that every passerby would read and understand. Creel really liked
the idea of pictorial propaganda because the entire message could be viewed as opposed
to read, and while not everybody was going to read an article in a newspaper, every
walker and runner would be a witness to the message and idea of the poster. When the
government first tried to use the Division of Pictorial Publicity it only wanted the artists
to show images of people conserving things such as coal and food. While these concepts
are essential for victory during war time, the artist themselves believed that there talents
could portray much more vivid images, images that stirred up emotion in people. Gibson
wanted his artists to draw posters that would create feelings of empathy. Gibson realized,
much like Creel, that propaganda was effective because it intruded on the emotional and
spiritual dimension of the human psyche, it was not merely information to be taken at its
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face value, a concept that most bureaucrats did not understand. Many department heads
in the CPI only wanted pictures of food and ammunition to portray the countries need to
conserve those things. It was Gibson who thought that making someone realize what it
feels like to be hungry, or what it feels like to be scared is much more effective in
producing change because it creates those feelings of understanding. Empathy is a
powerful tool for the propagandist and both Creel and Gibson knew this, and while the
government wanted the division to tell the story, Gibson wanted to show the people the
story and inspire them to change their ways.
One such image that the Division created was drawn by James Montgomery
Flagg, the most famous of all the Division’s artists. He was the artist that made the
famous picture of Uncle Sam pointing at the onlooker with the caption that says, “I Want
YOU for U.S. Army.” Another well known, but not as popular image that Flagg drew
depicts a redheaded young man on a white background. The young man is clearly angry,
as shown by his tense jaw and thrust out chin. He is pulling of his jacket as if he wants to
hit someone. At his feet is a crumpled up hat and right next to the hat is a newspaper
with the headline “HUNS KILL WOMEN AND CHILDREN!” (See Appendix A). At
the top of the poster are the words:
TELL THAT TO THE MARINES!
At 24 East 23rd Street
This poster symbolizes the Marines mission to end the inhumane acts of the enemy, and
should the viewer want to do something about those acts, the poster tells where the local
enlisting office is. The poster is dramatic, it is a great example of graphic propaganda,
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and the type of image Creel had in mind when envisioning how effective the Division of
Pictorial Publicity could be.
Another idea to promote government policy and strengthen American unity was
forced upon George Creel by what he called a “handsome rosy-cheeked youth” named
Donald Ryerson. Ryerson barged into the office of the CPI one day, grabbed Creel by his
jacket lapel and proceeded to explain his idea of the Four-Minute Men. The Four-Minute
Men was a large group of public speakers, around 75,000 of them, that gave informative
and persuasive speeches in the four minutes it took to change the reel at a movie theater.
Their name directly related to the time frame and to the Minute Men of the revolutionary
army, and Creel instantly viewed them as the most effective resource in his propaganda
machine. Speakers were chosen locally, so they could identify with their audience. One
main reason this was done was because there were so many different nationalities and
factions of people in the United States at the time. Creel realized that by choosing locally
prominent, and favorably viewed individuals, he could reach and unify the different
ethnic sects more easily. The speakers were given a list of topics to speak on from the
CPI, and the speakers changed the location and organization of their speeches to avoid
sounding like they were delivering government propaganda. Some examples of topics
that the Four-Minute Men spoke about were protesting German propaganda, as well as,
support for the Red Cross, the YMCA, Liberty Loans, and food conservation. These
speakers were very influential in promoting Creel’s war aims and they instantly became
his favorite propaganda tool during the war. Since the three main information outlets in
1917 were Newspapers, Magazines and Movies, Creel now had propaganda reaching
almost every American in every town across the country.
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Post World War I Critics of U.S. Propaganda
Following the Great War, a number of critics started discussing the ethical
concerns they had with regards to the United States’ use of propaganda on the American
people. Some critics, like Edward L. Bernays, believed that propaganda was a necessary
tool that the government had to use; however, he recognized that it was a tool that could
be misused as easily as it could be used properly. He says, “The instruments by which
public opinion is organized and focused may be misused. But such organization and
focusing are necessary to orderly life” (Bernays 12). The American people are already
busy with their lives; therefore, a lot of the decision-making that they do is based on the
information provided to them by so-called “experts.” These experts differ from field to
field, but in every field they are present, and the American people rely on them to narrow
decisions down so a simple choice is all that remains. “In theory, every citizen makes up
his mind on public questions and matters of private conduct. In practice, if all men had to
study for themselves the abstruse economic, political, and ethical data involved in every
question, they would find it impossible to come to a conclusion about anything. We have
voluntarily agreed to let an invisible government sift the data and high-spot the
outstanding issues so that our field of choice shall be narrowed to practical proportions”
(Bernays 11). No one has enough time to research every particle of data that goes into
the decision making process, so we appoint people, or experts, in high ranking positions
to narrow the types of decision we have to make. For Bernays, the ethical concerns of
propaganda depend “upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the
information published” (20). He believes that as long as the information being presented
is truthful, and not deliberately false, then it can be seen as ethically viable, but when a
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propagandist deliberately tells lies, or their goal is to promote ideas that are not beneficial
to the common good, then they are unethical. In fact, Bernays argues that propaganda is
absolutely necessary for government to be successful. “Governments, whether they are
monarchial, constitutional, democratic or communist, depend upon acquiescent public
opinion for the success of their efforts and, in fact, government is only government by
virtue of public acquiescence” (38). Without propaganda, the government would be able
to accomplish very little because public opinion may be too diverse to legislate new
policy. In times of war, the ability to create new legislation is essential to success
because necessity changes daily when a country is at war. One day, the country may
need to conserve food, while the next day it may need to subdue media reports that
jeopardize American troops. Regardless of the circumstance, the government needs to be
able to form new policy to meet the demands of the country. This could not be
accomplished without the use of propaganda, which molds and unifies the ideals and
beliefs of the masses and helps to approve the new laws that are essential for success.
Another advocate of U.S. propaganda during World War I is Stephen Ponder. In
an article titled, “Popular Propaganda: The Food Administration in World War I” Ponder
argues that America’s use of propaganda was vital in the conservation of resources
during the First World War. He says that the Food Administration, headed by Herbert
Hoover was seen by many as a positive use of propaganda, most likely due to the fact that
it involved a “humanitarian appeal” (545). Even though the Food Administration worked
in direct contact with the CPI, society and journalists viewed the Administration’s efforts
as a positive use of propaganda that was essential during war. According to Ponder,
“Government use of [. . .] techniques of mass persuasion [were] not universally
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condemned but, in the case of the U.S. Food Administration, sometimes regarded as
inspirational” (545). However, Ponder continues on to say that the methods of the Food
Administration were very similar, if not identical, to the methods being used by the CPI
during the war, and if not for the “humanitarian appeal” that was associated with food
conservation, the Administration would have probably been viewed in the same negative
light as Creel and the CPI.
While I have listed some proponents of American propaganda during the Great
War, there are many who opposed the idea of a government-controlled propaganda
machine. One such opponent is Stephen Vaughn, who wrote in his article, “Committee
on Public Information,” that “Although many of the people who contributed to the CPI
had a genuine commitment to democracy, the excessive ideological fervor that Creel and
others brought to their work left an unfortunate legacy. The CPI encouraged a type of
nationalism that too often endangered democracy. It was too ready to suspend free
speech. […] Too many of its posters and other forms of propaganda appealed to fear and
other emotions, and the apparent success of such endeavors encouraged postwar cynicism
about democratic theory and the rationality of public opinion” (156-7). Vaughn makes a
point that is hard to argue with since the Division of Pictorial Publicity did use the fear
appeal as its primary motivator. But what Vaughn fails to account for is the realistic fear
that existed. The United States was at war, and in war, fear is a tool to be used for
survival, which is necessary for victory. A country cannot fight if it has no soldiers to
fight with; therefore, a fear appeal to get citizens to enlist could be seen as essential to the
success of America in the Great War. Still, the idea that the CPI encouraged a type of
nationalism that hindered democracy is truthful, but in times of war, unity is more
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important than democracy. Manipulating information to unify a country and protect its
citizens is more important than giving everyone unlimited access to potentially hazardous
information. If a threat of an upcoming attack on American soil were released to all
Americans, it is not hard to imagine that panic would ensue. If everyone were panicking,
how would the country prepare for the attack? In times of war it is essential to suppress
certain freedoms that democracy affords for the benefit of the entire nation. Freedom of
press and freedom of speech are powerful things that can be of great importance to a
nation, but in times of war the same tools can be detrimental to the outcome of the battle,
and if they are not limited in some respects, it can lead to the deaths of thousands of lives.
The Perception of Propaganda Following the War
In June 1919, directly following the end of World War I, Congress abolished the
CPI. The main reason the CPI was abolished was due to “American distrust of
propaganda and Congress's fear that the president would utilize the committee for
domestic political purposes” (Propaganda). The reason American’s had formed a distrust
of governmental propaganda was due, in large part, to the discovery of Britain’s use of
propaganda on the U.S. to get them to enter the war. While the United States was still
neutral in the early half of the 1910’s, British propaganda was hard at work fabricating
stories of inhumane German crimes to influence America into joining the War. “Tales of
Germans cutting off the hands of children, boiling corpses to make soap, crucifying
prisoners of war, and using priests as clappers in cathedral bells were nauseating yarns
widely believed among both Allies and friendly neutrals” (Brown 85). These kinds of
stories came to be viewed as primary reasons for the United States’ entry into the war
among American citizens, which was to stop the German atrocities abroad. Once people
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became aware that Britain had created propaganda to motivate the United States to join
the Allies, they started to blame the British, and their propaganda, for getting America
involved in such a “wasteful and ruinous war” (Propaganda). The association between
British propaganda and America’s entry into a wasteful war created most of the
negatively perceived functions of propaganda, which caused the public and Congress to
become skeptical of Wilson and Creel and their CPI, leading to the eradication of the
Committee on Public Information. The “atrocity propaganda” used by the British in
America was widely popularized and used by the newspapers, which informed the public
of the so-called “truths” the government was presenting to the public. One such paper
that reported atrocity propaganda was The Times, which wrote a story on the German’s
use of corpses to make soap. The story goes:
The bodies are transported on this endless chain into a long, narrow compartment,
where they pass through a bath which disinfects them. They then go through a
drying chamber, and finally are automatically carried into a digester or great
cauldron, in which they are dropped by an apparatus which detaches them from
the chain. In the digester they remain from six to eight hours, and are treated by
steam, which breaks them up while they are slowly stirred by the machinery.
From this treatment result several products. The fats are broken up into stearin, a
form of tallow, and oils, which require to be redistilled before they can be used.
The process of distillation is carried out by boiling the oil with carbonate of soda,
and some of the by-products resulting from this are used by German soap makers.
The oil distillery and refinery lie in the south-eastern corner of the works. The
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refined oil is sent out in small casks like those used for petroleum, and is of
yellowish brown color. (Grubach)
Stories like this, which are provided with extremely vivid detail, go a long way toward
persuading someone to prevent such atrocities. Of course, this was the goal of the British
newspapers, to motivate people toward action. Once the public realized that governments
were fabricating stories to influence action, they began associating the term propaganda
with more negative ideologies, which led to the differentiation between what was the
truth, and what was propaganda.

Conclusion
When the CPI formed and began censoring and restricting certain liberties,
American’s Started feeling betrayed by their government, but it is important to realize
that the circumstances of war require unique actions. Information becomes invaluable for
both our allies and our enemies during battle. In the wrong hands, certain information
could cost America the war and many American lives, but by controlling what was
published, the CPI was able to succeed in its goals of unifying and protecting America.
By unifying the country the CPI was able to pass legislation and conserve resources.
Through censoring the media, Creel was able to protect troops abroad and civilians at
home. Creel was so effective at manipulating public opinion because he utilized
propaganda in the right ways. I mentioned the criteria for effective propaganda that
Leonard Doob described above, and Creel did a great job of following the guidelines of
effective propaganda. He affected personalities and directed the behavior of individuals
by molding public opinion via inspirational speeches delivered by the Four-Minutemen
and graphic posters hung across the country. Creel chose goals and messages that had
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little scientific value, which made his messages that much more potent because there was
no science to disprove him. Lastly, because the war was underway, Creel managed to
make his goals possible within the foreseeable future. All American’s wanted victory
and Creel offered them the belief that it was obtainable, but only if they followed him.
Bernays and Ponder offer the American people a reasonable excuse for the CPI’s
actions, saying that what it accomplished was for the benefit of society as a whole. I
believe that they are right in their conclusions. There are certain liberties that need to be
restricted when human lives are on the line. Individuals in general, are more concerned
with the small picture, the self, and that is why they feel cheated when the news they
receive is censored. Americans started to believe that their government had deemed them
unworthy of knowing such information, which created resentment between the people
and their government. But the government is generally concerned with the big picture,
the nation, and what is best for its inhabitants, and Wilson and Creel realized what
needed to be done to protect America and win the war.
While there are critics on both sides of the argument about whether or not Creel
was ethical in his course of action, few can argue against how impressive the propaganda
campaign during the First World War was. The ability of one man to create an
organization that extended its influence to almost every country in the world, as well as
his tactful control and manipulation of the ideals of American’s is amazing. He is one of
the greatest examples of how effective propaganda can be. By unifying the American
people through pictures, print and speeches, he drove Americans toward eliminating a
real enemy, making the world, as Wilson and Creel put it, “Safe for Democracy.”
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